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Book Reviews
Contemporary War
It Takes More than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and
Organizational Adaptation
By Chad C. Serena
Reviewed by Ross Harrison, School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University, Middle Eastern Politics at University of Pittsburgh

C

had Serena’s book makes a major contribution to our understanding
of the nuts and bolts of the Iraqi insurgency, at a time when the
United States is actually encountering remnants of that insurgency in
the form of ISIS. He pulls back the veil on the insurgency movement
with the most systematic and methodologically clear treatment to date.
He uses his skill as a political scientist and experience at Rand to dissect
the insurgency, exposing its strengths but also its weaknesses, which he
claims are manifold. Serena drives home the point about the weaknesses
of the Iraqi insurgency network by contrasting it with the more effective
Afghan network.
His basic thesis, enshrined in the title of his impressive volume is the
insurgency in Iraq is not unified, but involves a network with multiple
strengths, but also many vulnerabilities. By very effectively analyzing
network dynamics, he debunks the notion this kind organizational
model is necessarily more adaptive or leads to greater effectiveness. This
insight makes a major contribution, since some conventional wisdom
shows networks, particularly for non-state actors like al-Qaeda, generally confer strength. Serena essentially argues networks neither confer
strengths nor weaknesses. Rather, whether a network is a robust model
depends on its nature, such as size, diversity, and information transfer.
Like networks themselves, the book has strengths but also several
weaknesses. Because Serena relies so heavily on his framework, the
book has more the feel of a political science primer on networks than
a book about the political dynamics of the insurgency of Iraq. Rather
than using the framework suggestively to tease out insights, he applies it
more rigidly, using the Iraqi insurgency almost as a case study to amplify
his insights about networks. This has an impact on the reader, as we are
left feeling we are observing the Iraqi insurgency at 30,000 feet rather
than at ground level. Because of this, the book seems almost apolitical.
There is always the danger when dissecting something of losing sight of
its essence. The Iraqi insurgency was messy, dynamic and ever changing.
The book treats it too antiseptically.
The most puzzling omission was the failure to mention how during
the Sunni Awakening, General David Petraeus used some of the vulnerabilities Serena identified to drive a wedge between Al-Qaeda in Iraq
(which later became ISIS) and the Sunni tribal leaders, something that
would have added to the texture of the book and made it more relevant
for today. Many of the issues the United States and its coalition partners
are facing today in Iraq concern both the strengths and vulnerabilities
of a Sunni network. Serena could have made this less of a textbook and
more of a policy book by pulling the argument forward a bit. While ISIS
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did not gain international notoriety until 2014, the signs of its strengthening were evident at the time of the publication of the book.
That said, Serena makes a valuable scholarly contribution by giving
us a systematic treatment of the Iraqi insurgency. In a world where much
of the work on Iraq is descriptive and off-the-cuff, Serena’s methodologically sound treatment adds tremendous value.

War Without Fighting? The Reintegration of Former
Combatants in Afghanistan Seen Through the Lens of
Strategic Thought
By Uwe Hartmann
Reviewed by Daniel J. Glickstein, Corporal, US Army National Guard, Research
Analyst, and National Security Education Program (Boren) Scholarship
recipient
Berlin, Germany: MilesVerlag, 2014
146 pages
$17.00 (paper)

W

ar Without Fighting by German officer Uwe Hartmann emphasizes
the primacy of reintegration in resolving protracted conflicts.
Reintegration here is defined as “the process by which ex-combatants
acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.”(9)
Hartmann’s work nestles within the existing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration field, but adds a key twist by insisting policy-makers
pursue reintegration during a conflict, instead of waiting until hostilities have ceased. His additional expertise on Carl von Clausewitz and
a chapter devoted to civil-military relations are welcome bonuses in his
book.
Counterinsurgency, Reintegration, Kinetic Operations?
Hartmann asserts the failure to connect counterinsurgency (COIN)
with a broader, overarching political strategy has been a critical shortcoming in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Reintegration
should not be a means to COIN, but instead COIN should be a means
to support reintegration. Reintegration, in order to be successful, must
be seen as the overall political concept that directs COIN.” (70) This
line of thinking echoes similar COIN-phrases such as the importance
of connecting military and political aims, and the idea that you “can’t
kill yourself out of an insurgency.” But Hartmann’s work shines when
fleshing out subtler concepts within the reintegration process.
Moving beyond catchphrases and mantras, Hartmann devotes
careful attention to the social science underpinning support or mistrust
in insurgencies. Beginning at the basic level, he discusses how government legitimacy and capability (or lack thereof) can make or break
popular support. He then moves further into detailing the side-effects
of negative capability and legitimacy. These detract from popular perception and create skepticism and lead to hedging.
Perception is my preferred term for the much-maligned “hearts and
minds” phrase. Put simply, how populations perceive the ruling governments will directly impact their actions. This phrasing is also useful
in clarifying the chain of action here; positive or negative government
actions dictate the population’s perception. It is an input-output relationship, and trying to bolster community relations without changing
the actual government will do nothing to solve underlying problems.
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Hedging is tackled later: when a new government is faltering and its
stability is unclear, “the buy-in of local leaders may remain limited, so
long as they perceive a need to hedge their communities against insurgents.” (23) This is a logical thought, and one seen especially often in
Afghanistan (the example cited in the book is of an Afghan family who
has one son in the Taliban and one in the Afghan National Army), yet it
has garnered hushed discussion at best.
This hedging behavior explains the tug-of-war between insurgents
and government forces, and is a topic well-worth further study. But there
is no “critical mass” within a specific area for insurgents to win or lose.
Every case is subjective, and there is no mathematic formula to predict
when popular support will shift. For example, rural Afghan villagers in a
region with a limited Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) presence
are at high-risk of being intimidated and harmed at night by insurgents.
Hearts and minds are irrelevant here; when civilians are facing mortal
danger on a regular basis they are unlikely to unfurl an Afghan flag and
proclaim full support for the government.
Filling in the Blanks
Given the situational nature of low-intensity conflicts and reintegration processes, developing universal laws and guidance can be stumbling
blocks. As seen with American counter-insurgency doctrine, theorists
can develop broad statements, but no one can write standard operating procedures for one thousand different situations with guarantees of
appropriateness and success.
Thus, Hartmann’s work leaves us with a sturdy platform to conduct
further thinking, research, and writing. His overall thesis is the primacy
of reintegration is useful and correct. Yet the devil is in the details, and
future practitioners will have to forge ahead themselves and discover
unique approaches; for example, how to pursue transitional justice
regarding human rights violations while reintegrating enemy forces into
a new government.
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Military Technology
Drones and Targeted Killings: Ethics, Law, Politics
Edited by Sarah Knuckey
Reviewed by Ben Lerner, Vice President for Government Relations, Center for
Security Policy

A
New York, NY: IDEBATE
Press, 2014
392 pages
$25.99 (paper)

s global jihadist organizations continue to ramp up targeting of
the West and its allies – [both as a result of collaboration with
one another, and as a means of vying for primacy within their collective
movement] – the United States will continue to look to deployment of
unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) as a valuable counterterrorism tool,
enabling the use of precise lethal force with comparatively little risk to
non-combatants on the ground, and zero risk of American casualties.
While drones have undoubtedly provided the American warfighter with
significant tactical advantage over an asymmetric enemy that operates
without legal or moral constraint, their prominence in the targeted
killing component of U.S. counterterrorism efforts has ignited substantial debate over the legality and advisability of using such weapons for
this purpose, particularly away from the so-called “hot” battlefields of
Afghanistan and Iraq.
In Drones and Targeted Killings: Ethics, Law, Politics, Prof. Sarah Knuckey
of Columbia Law School endeavors to introduce readers to the various
contours of this debate. Drawing from numerous sources from within
and outside government, Knuckey compiles several speeches and articles
(or excerpts thereof) covering drone strikes, and divides them into four
categories: 1) Are drone strikes effective? 2) Are drone strikes ethical?
3) Are drones strikes legal? and 4) Transparency and Accountability–
Efforts and Obstacles.
Knuckey frames her objective as follows: “Drones and Targeted Killings
was designed to stimulate debate among those who are new to the issues.
It brings to the fore human rights, civil liberties, and civilian protection issues, while introducing readers to a range of diverse views from
a variety of sources.” She succeeds in achieving these goals in some
respects, but falls short in others.
The effectiveness section strikes a reasonable balance between
those who argue drone strikes are effective in countering terrorist
operatives and organizations, and those who argue they are ineffective
or even counterproductive. Thoughtful arguments asserting effectiveness – including from CIA Director John Brennan, American University
law professor Kenneth Anderson, and Daniel Byman of Georgetown
University – are paired with likewise thoughtful counter-arguments
from the Stimson Center and Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign
Relations, exploring at times concepts such as the extent and importance of “blowback” vis-à-vis drone strikes; the reliability of data on
civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes; and the extent to which
US drone strike practice could affect how other nations use their own
drones in the future.
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The ethics section is similarly balanced, exploring varying points
of view on whether US drone strike practice is moral or immoral. Some
themes emerging in this section include 1) the impact of the drone’s
precision on the ethics question. For instance, Kenneth Anderson and
New York Times journalist Scott Shane argues the precision of drones,
particularly relative to other weapons, could be used on counterterrorism missions but would result in higher numbers of civilian deaths;
and Professors John Kaag and Sarah Kreps, and Conor Friedersdorf of
The Atlantic, argue the precision capabilities of drones could paradoxically encourage more frequent and less judicious use of force and 2) the
extent to which the remoteness of drone operators from the battlefield
risks creating a videogame mentality towards lethal force – an especially
important contribution in this regard comes from the late journalist Matthew Power, whose profile of drone sensor operator Brandon
Bryant’s struggles with post-traumatic stress disorder provides a snapshot of how drone operators can be deeply affected by their missions,
even if operating from thousands of miles away.
Perhaps the most contentious area of debate on the subject of US
drone strikes, however, has been their legality under domestic and international law, which makes Knuckey’s construction of the legal section
problematic. The balance the reader finds present in the effectiveness
and ethics sections is regrettably lacking with respect to the legal
discussion. While Knuckey does offer up a lengthy excerpt from thenAttorney General Eric Holder’s address at Northwestern University
defending the legality of the drone strike program, the rest of the selections in this section are weighted heavily towards arguing the illegality
of the program, an arrangement which casts the Obama administration
as alone in arguing against what is portrayed as the preponderance of
non-governmental analysis on this question. It would have been helpful
for Knuckey to include a couple of writings from a range of scholars
who have written in defense of the program’s legality, including Steven
Groves, James Carafano, Prof. Michael Lewis, Prof. Jordan Paust, Prof.
Charles Dunlap (USAF, Ret.), and David French, to name just a few.
The transparency section similarly lacks representation from non-government analysis arguing in favor of less transparency regarding the US
drone strike program, although that is perhaps a more understandable
omission given what would appear to be a relative lack of such sources.
Drones and Targeted Killings: Ethics, Law, Politics is a good read, up to a
point, for those seeking a variety of views on select aspects of the drone
strike debate. Knuckey, however, is more faithful to her objective of
“introducing readers to a diverse range of views” in the first half than
in the latter.

Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation
By Gabriel Weimann
Reviewed by Jeffrey L. Caton, Colonel (USAF, Retired), President, Kepler
Strategies LLC

G

abriel Weimann opens Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation by
asking “Can we declare the war on terrorism to be over?” Clearly we
cannot, or so the author contends as he builds the case “that terrorists’
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presence and the use of cyberspace is today more sophisticated, richer,
and broader than a decade ago.” While Weimann offers credible articles,
reports, and case studies to illustrate his assertions, he does so through
the lens of the same 9/11 goggles with which he opened his 2006 work,
Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges. As is the case
with many sequels, his new book repeats a significant amount of the
content from its predecessor. Ironically, it fails to capture the wealth of
data concerning changes in terrorist groups, cyberspace capabilities, and
societal habits that have emerged in the intervening nine years.
Terrorism in Cyberspace narrows the scope of the diverse world of
terrorism and ignores many of the operations addressed in the first
book, such as those by groups like the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo and
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The result is
an interesting recitation of vignettes of Islamic extremists’ use of the
Internet that, unfortunately, is lacking in broader critical analysis of all
current forms of terrorism in cyberspace, let alone future ones. In short,
this book is a disappointment; it does not deliver the material implicitly
promised by the title, and it does not deliver on its own explicit criteria.
Weimann states that the book is written to address three research
questions: What are the new faces of online terrorism? What can be
expected in the near future? How can we counter these trends? These
questions receive uneven treatment covered in 11 chapters separated
into three parts that surprisingly do not parallel these questions.
Part I, “Terrorism Enters Cyberspace,” is largely a repeat of the first
four chapters of Terror on the Internet updated with new examples. It is
here that Weimann fails to provide the fundamental context necessary
for readers to comprehend the topic’s scope. Specifically, some of the
most basic definitions and metrics on terrorist incidents—such as the
actual growth (or decline); the criteria that links them to cyberspace;
and the criteria that links them to terrorists—are not addressed. The
only historical data presented are two graphs showing the number of
academic publications and the number of articles (Washington Post and
New York Times) written on Internet terrorism from 1996 to 2013. Sadly,
the reader is left wondering if cyberspace-related terrorist acts number
in the tens, hundreds, or thousands. If the reader happens to be a senior
leader entrusted with decision making for resources and priorities, these
are vital statistics.
Part II, “Emerging Trends,” provides interesting insights with
regard to cyberspace-related means and methods—such as “narrowcasting,” social media, and “online fatwas”—used by terrorist groups to
identify and groom recruits. Among these are the “lone wolf terrorists”
that Weimann claims to be “the fastest growing form of terrorism.”
But again, the reader must accept this assertion on faith; no evidence in
terms of number of lone wolf attacks and their severity is included. Also,
the discourse makes simplistic cause-and-effect connections between
such attacks and any alleged cyberspace means. In this, Weimann fails
to distinguish the ills attributed to changes in terrorist tools and activities on the web from similar extreme behavior that society writ large
wrestles with on the Internet, such as addictions to online pornography
or gambling.
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Included in Part III, “Future Threats and Challenges,” is the discussion of countermeasures and counter narratives. While Weimann does
introduce the concepts of the “noise” and MUD (monitoring, using,
disrupting) models as well as potential roles of public-private partners,
the material is broadly descriptive with few practical details. Terrorism
in Cyberspace ends abruptly with a single paragraph in the last chapter.
There the author wraps up the journey of both books with “we live in
a dangerous world threatened by terrorism, and intelligence agencies
should do their utmost to protect us against terrorist plots.” While it’s
hard to argue with this conclusion, readers probably expect more at the
end of almost 600 collective pages.
Perhaps this book could serve well as a primer or narrative annotated bibliography for an undergraduate class interested in the narrow
topic of Islamic-related extremist groups’ use of various instruments
in cyberspace. Weimann conducted his research with the backing of
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, an organization that aims to inform national leadership in a nonpartisan forum. No
doubt his 14-year long research efforts have considerable merit toward
this goal. However, with its paucity of context and rigor, Terrorism in
Cyberspace is not adequate to inform actionable ideas on threats for the
full diversity of terrorism in the dynamic environment of cyberspace.

Governing Military Technologies in the 21st Century
By Richard Michael O’Meara
Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz. Visiting Research Professor
at the US Army War College and Professor of International Relations and
Comparative Politics at Armstrong State University, Savannah, Georgia

C

onflicts in the twenty-first century will not take place in the jungles
of Southeast Asia or some other exotic location around the world.
Most conflicts in the twenty-first century will take place in major metropolitan areas. Also, conflicts in the twenty-first century will be heavily
dependent on new forms of technologies previously non-existent and
those new technologies will have a tremendous impact in the conduct
of war in new technological environments. Given the new emerging
technologies and how they will impact the conduct of war in the future,
we need to rethink national security and how the new technologies will
impact the conduct of war. Retired US Army Brigadier General Richard
M. O’Meara examines the big five emerging technologies that are shaping
and are being shaped by the environments in which they have been
employed. O’Meara examines emerging military technologies including nanotech, robotics, cyberwar, human enhancement, and non-lethal
weapons. O’Meara also describes the technological uncertainty of the
environment in which they are created, and engages the reader in the discussion regarding past attempts to govern technologies and the potential
for future governance. As O’Meara points out, governance of military
technologies must reflect the legal and ethical concerns of the people the
military is sworn to protect; yet it must also recognize the existential need
for soldiers to accomplish a myriad of violent and dangerous tasks while
at the same time looking out for the welfare of soldiers. (80)
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O’Meara’s focus in this timely book is not on the particular technology itself, but rather “the ability of the group to envision and organize its
application, conceive of its relationship and use with other technologies,
and otherwise maximize its benefits as it competes with other groups.”
(4) The advancement of new technologies in the war making environment is no longer just limited to the superpowers of the world. With the
democratization of technology even rogue nations will have the ability
to acquire those newly developed technologies as part of its arsenal of
war making. O’Meara argues, “technology is available democratically,
it is innovation in a space of technological uncertainty and its power to
change the way humans operate on all levels is staggering.” (99) Another
characteristic of democratization of technology is the fact that it “will
continue to be pervasive, and their use has considerable impact on the
ways humankind operates.” (6)
Given the fact that the theoretical “genie has come out of the
bottle” in regards to technology in the twenty-first century, the question becomes who gets to decide what to design, when to design it,
and how to use particular technology in future conflicts? The debate
regarding the development, implementation, and regulation of new
technologies has been polarizing between two competing schools of
thought. The libertarian school argues that, “society should not and
cannot put constraints on the development of new technology.” (81)
The other school of thought is composed of a “heterogeneous group
with moral concerns about biotechnology, consisting of those who have
religious convictions, environmentalists with a belief in the sanctity of
nature, opponents of new technology, and people on the Left who are
worried about the possibility of eugenics.” (83) While the debates goes
on, O’Meara suggests several mechanisms that “may be useful should
one wish to seek international regulation of the various specific issues
with each technology brings to the table.” (84) For example, international treaties; prohibitions and limitations on the acquisition of certain
weapons; prohibitions and limitations on research and development;
prohibitions and limitations on testing; prohibitions and limitations on
deployment; prohibitions and limitations on transfer/proliferation; and
finally, prohibitions and limitations on use.
The military of the twenty-first century will not be the military of
the twentieth century. These radical changes are the results of recent
developments in technology that will forever have a tremendous impact
on the conduct of conflicts in the twenty-first century. Students at the
US Army War College will do themselves a favor by reading US Army
Brigadier General O’Meara timely book on the governing military technologies in the twentieth century. As General O’Meara concludes, “this
book argues that failure to act will not stop the use of these technologies.
Rather, military technologies will continue to emerge with or without
restraint, their unanticipated consequences are a matter of record. The
genie is out of the bottle and [its] supervision is possible but not inevitable.” (102-103)
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Civil-Military Relations
Congress and Civil-Military Relations
Edited by Colton C. Campbell and David R. Auerswald
Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Colonel (USA, Ret), Professor of Leadership and
Cultural Studies, US Army War College

T

rust is a recurring theme within the United States military’s recent
study of the profession of arms. Within the profession, it is the trust
among its members: officers and enlisted as well as the senior and junior
members of the armed services. More important is the trust between
the profession and the society it serves. Such trust is enabled through
the civil-military relations of elected officials and uniformed members
of the US Armed Services. In our nation, two civilian bodies are constitutionally obligated to control the military—the Office of the President
and the US Congress. While civilian supremacy is most demonstrated by
the direction and orders of the Commander in Chief, equally vital roles
of regulation and oversight are provided by the Congress. Hence the
necessity to explore and understand this aspect of civil-military relations.
National War College professors Colton Campbell and David Auerswald
have compiled such a primer for national security professionals.
Campbell and Auerswald, editors of Congress and Civil-Military
Relations, have gathered a diverse group of scholars, political scientists,
and practitioners from academia, professional military education, and
those who have served in US government. Within their areas of expertise and experience, each author addresses a unique element of the many
facets of civil-military relations by offering a short history, establishing
context with current concerns, and then providing implications for the
future of defense policy making. Their contributions result in an edited
work that is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive, but gives readers an
appreciation of the appreciation of the enduring nature of civil military
relations as well as its shifting character through the use of well-chosen
cases.
In their Chapter 1 introduction, the editors assert the congressional
role is underappreciated and show how Congress shapes the culture
and behavior of the US military by using four main tools. The tools
are: “selection of military officers, determining how much authority
is delegated to the military, oversight of the military, and establishing
incentives (positive and negative) for appropriate military behavior.”
(2) Accordingly, the first part of the book consists of chapters that
illustrate the evolution and application of each tool. Chapter 2 reviews
processes for the appointment, selection, and promotion of officers; this
is especially interesting given by October 2016 each of seven four-star
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nominated by President Obama
will require confirmation by the Congress before assuming the most
senior positions within the US military.
Chapter 3, “A Safety Valve” is informative and very effective in
recounting the leadership of then Senator Harry Truman and the actions
of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program
in the prelude to and onset of World War II. Concerns about the lack
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of military preparedness as well as “revelations of graft, greed, and corruption among defense contractors” provide an historical analogy to
consider as the US seeks to discern its lessons learned during the War
on Terror in this twenty-first century. (38) For World War II, as with
most wars, the call for expediency in the name of military necessity
quickly became suspect with accounts of poor planning and mismanagement leading to ineffectiveness and inefficiency in providing military
capability and sustained capacity for national security. Decades later the
Truman committee became the exemplar for a series of post-Vietnam
War ad hoc congressional defense commissions detailed in Chapter 4.
The chapter author contends in addition to the goal to conduct oversight
of the Department of Defense, congressional commissions are created
to advance an agenda or policy reform, to avoid blame, or to delay
action—“kicking the can down the road”—on particularly controversial matters. (53) Such is the case in Chapters 5 and 6 as congressional
members respectively embrace the reserve component for its state
support versus federal role or the TRICARE-FOR-LIFE entitlements
for veterans among their constituents.
While the six chapters of Part I provides historical context of the
use of tools by Congress, Part II offers a more interesting examination
of the debates within the two Houses of the legislative branch and, in
turn, with the executive branch on the use of military force to support
US foreign policy. Readers will be familiar with the discourse in Chapter
7 on lack of the consensus within the US government or its political
parties on the national policy agenda. This discord has been attributed
to increased polarization rather than parochialism. From Chapter 8,
debates beginning with defense roles and missions affect force structure
in the active component-reserve component mix of the US military.
Subsequently, Congress becomes part of the political mechanism to
exploit technologies that may generate new capabilities and mitigate
emergent threats in the twenty-first century (see Chapter 9 cases on
Cyber and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Drones). Chapters 10 and 11
examine the role of Congress facing the challenges of consistency in the
demonstration of US national values as provided in the cases of closure
of Guantanamo detention facility and the support of human rights in
Latin America.
Some observers may naively bash Congress for its deference to the
executive branch out of tradition or necessity, its ambivalence to issues
not directly affecting local constituency or party agenda, or its abdication in areas deemed too messy or politically untenable. Former Speaker
of the House Tip O’Neill often said, “All politics is local” referring to
congressional members acting in short and long-term interests of their
voters, which may be seemingly contrary to ambiguous national interests.
The challenge for an edited volume such as Congress and Civil-Military
Relations is to determine how much material to include and what to leave
out. A deeper discussion of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the
potential impact of its associated sequestration measures deserved more
consideration since it stills looms over defense policy with implications
for military readiness and force structure. Acknowledgement of the view
of Congress by those in uniform as a practical and important aspect of
civil-military relations is also missing from the text.
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Accordingly, Campbell and Auerswald author the concluding chapter, which derives three policy issues from the contributors:
ongoing congressional debate on future of the defense budget following
the major operations of the War on Terror; congressional intent and
ability to shape social and international agendas through US defense
policy, and the growing civil-military divide between an increasing
polarized Congress and a confident, professionalized military. The
editors have produced a useful book for those seeking to understand
the often overlooked, but critical aspect of US civil-military relations. As
a primer, their work can start the conversation and spark deeper inquiry
and discourse among national security professionals.

The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation: Canada in Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Afghanistan
By Christopher Ankersen
Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz. Visiting Research Professor
at the US Army War College and Professor of International Relations and
Comparative Politics at Armstrong State University, Savannah, Georgia

C

ivil-military cooperation is a hallmark of contemporary military
operations in the twenty-first century. Yet, as Christopher Ankersen
articulates in his book The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation, little has been
written about this important concept/idea from a theoretical perspective. Ankersen’s book concentrates on civil-military cooperation from the
military’s point of view. According to the author, this focus is warranted
for several reasons. First, while civil-military cooperation is the product
of a Trinitarian relationship within a given society, it is largely carried
out by only one of those actors—the military. Second, there are some
indications that this may be beginning to change, but in the time period
under examination (1999-2007), “civil military cooperation” is a military
practice. Ankersen’s operational definition of civil-military cooperation
is a long one but worth quoting verbatim:
All measures undertaken between commanders and national
authorities, civil, military, and para-military, which concern the relationship between (military forces), the national governments and civil
populations in an area where…military forces are deployed or plan
to be deployed, supported, or employed. Such measures would also
include cooperation and co-ordination of activities between commanders and non-governmental or international agencies, organizations and
authorities.
While Ankersen’s operational definition of civil-military cooperation is useful, there are problems with it. First, the term is a value-laden
one, in that it assumes a degree of cooperation or partnership that is by
no means universally present. (3) Second, the term connotes collaboration or coordination of, not necessarily direct involvement in, a range
of activities.
Ankersen’s The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation most important
contribution to the civil-military cooperation debate is his Clausewitzian
framework. By examining Canada’s civil-military cooperation efforts
in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan through the lens of Clausewitz’s
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“Remarkable Trinity,” Ankersen shows that military action is the
product of influences from the government, the Armed Forces, and the
people at home. As Clausewitz pointed out in his seminal work On War,
“a theory that ignores any of them would conflict with reality to such an
extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.” Ankersen
also argues that, “Clausewtiz tells us that war (and by extension, all military operations) is not purely a military activity. Rather, it is the result
of inputs from all aspects of a state. The people contribute passion; the
government provided direction; and the military applies its skill within
the realm of chance to affect a result.” (69)
In chapter 5 (The People); chapter 6 (The Government); and chapter
7 (the Military), Ankersen examines each of the three elements of the
Clausewitzian holy trinity. While the Clausewitzian holy trinity concept
has been widely used as a fundamental tool for the study of war, Ankersen
utilizes it to study civil-military cooperation within the context of the
Canadian military involvements in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan.
In chapter 5 (The People), Ankersen argues that the Canadian people,
while perhaps not projecting “hatred and enmity,” certainly provides
the government and the military with a degree of passion to be harnessed. (71) In chapter 6 (The Government), the second prong of the
Clausewitzian holy trinity, Ankersen shows that in the context of the
Canadian government, Canadian policy guidance can be seen, above all,
to maintain political legitimacy in the particular Canadian setting. (86)
That is, the government’s role in the Clausewitzian framework is a crucial
element. As Ankersen argues, “they [the Government] have harnessed
the emotion of the people, turning it from raw, inchoate desire, into a
refined and structured direction that the military can then execute.”
(99-100) Ankersen, in chapter 7 (the Military), argues that “the thinking
about civil-military cooperation in Canada was not very sophisticated.”
(115) This lack of sophistication is partially due to the “institutional
military in Canada ha[ving] a love-hate relationship with civil-military
cooperation.” (103) Yet, as part of the Clausewitzian holy trinity, the
military “exists first and foremost: to protect vital national interests; to
contribute to international peace and security; and to promote national
unity and well-being.” (111)
Ankersen’s The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation is a single country
study rather than a comparative study. While the focus on a single
country (Canada) may seem like a weakness of Ankersen’s study, the
author makes a compelling case that by concentrating on a single country,
“the dynamics behind civil-military cooperation can be understood as
richly as possible.” (11) Ankersen has chosen a single country for two
main reasons. First, Canada is a country of particular relevance in terms
of military participation in international security operations. Second,
Canada is a representative of other middle and small powers, in a way
that major and Great Powers, are not. Ankersen draws on a variety of
interviews with politicians and members of the Canadian military to
provide an in-depth examination that civil-military cooperation is not
just about soldiers following orders but also about negotiations, vested
interests, and contested group identities.
As the military is called upon to different parts of the world not
only to fight but also to act as “social workers,” Ankersen’s The Politics of
Civil-Military Cooperation should be read by all US Army College students.
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The Middle East and Africa
Occupying Syria Under the French Mandate: Insurgency,
Space and State Formation
By Daniel Neep
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

D

aniel Neep’s study of the French occupation of Syria during the
post-World War I mandate era is an interesting consideration of the
ideology, justification, and vocabulary of colonialism as well as an analysis of colonial warfare. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World
War I, the French sought to dominate the Levant through the League of
Nations mandate system to safeguard their perceived economic, strategic, and even religious interests (involving the protection of Christian
communities) in the region. The French government also viewed their
efforts in Syria as a “civilizing mission,” which was not to be disrupted
by anything as trivial as the wishes of the indigenous population. In
this spirit, the 23-year French mandate involved more than simply the
military imposition of nominal French rule. Rather, it entailed efforts
to transform completely the social, political, and economic systems
of Syrian society in ways designed to Westernize the population and
guarantee the future of French influence. In keeping with this outlook,
Syrian armed opposition to French rule was viewed as either irrational
reactionary resistance to modernization or mere banditry masquerading
as a national movement.
French authorities viewed the Levant as a “mosaic society” with
largely closed ethno-sectarian communities characterized by mutual
mistrust and internecine warfare. This “mosaic” was composed of
such groups as the Circassians, Druze, Alawites, Kurds, Shi’ite Arabs,
Christians, and Sunni Arabs made up the Syrian population. The French
based their strategies for Syria on the mosaic framework and were not
interested in alternative policies possibly uniting the Syrian population
into a single national identity, which they saw as threatening to their
interests. Colonial ethnological visions of Syria’s mosaic society were
consequently translated into institutional reality with separate policies
developed for different groups. Additionally, the French also undertook
detailed sociological studies to understand the nature of the indigenous
societies and cleavages within them. In describing this process, Neep
calls the science of ethnography a modern weapon of colonial warfare
within a divide and rule policy.
In considering the French attitude toward force, Neep draws a
distinction between “discipline,” which seeks complete military control
over an administered territory, and “security,” a cheaper and more
preferred method which involves measures ensuring the effective management of the territory without direct control or military oversight. By
the time of the mandate, France had a great deal of experience as an
imperial state and French theories about colonial administration were
well developed. Despite this experience, French military efforts had to
undergo considerable adaptation to address recurring difficulties which
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often forced them to use “discipline” rather than “security” to control
territory. Heavy French columns were continuously outmaneuvered
by light insurgent units, which often employed hit-and run tactics. In
response, the French transitioned from their heavy supply-laden columns
to more agile formations, which also had less firepower. They also used
their own irregular troops drawn from friendly elements of the Syrian
and Lebanese populations. Roadbuilding (with conscripted local labor)
became central to French ability to enable their units to respond quickly
to unrest. Additionally, in the unforgiving calculus of colonialism,
village populations fell into one of three sweeping categories: friendly
(often Christian), suspect, or enemy. Villages in the last two categories
were in particular danger of being razed in times of confrontation
between rebels and colonial authorities. During Syria’s Great Revolt of
1925, Neep describes the French burning of such villages as routine.
Syrian accounts of the French occupation unsurprisingly did not
accept the concept of a civilizing mission. Rather, they identified
the mandatory power as an alien presence serving as a continuation
of Ottoman despotism, which had to be fought. In resisting French
authority, the rebels faced a number of difficulties beyond the disparity
in military capabilities. These types of difficulties included problems
in coordinating military actions in a way that could place maximum
pressure on the occupation force. Rebel recruits often joined guerrilla
bands from their local area in units often coming from the same social
and sectarian background. It is extremely difficult to wage a meaningful anti-colonial struggle if different bands are fighting different wars
without any substantial coordination. Some rebel groups also fit the
French stereotype for them and were primarily interested in seeking
plunder. The rebel movement suffered from the lack of an effective plan
to suppress such activities.
The Syrian rebels had some advantages as well. A large number of
prominent fighters and rebel leaders had been trained as officers by the
Ottomans, and gained exposure to European military innovations at
Ottoman academies. Some former Ottoman officers who were Syrian
also served in the army of King Faysal during World War I and thereby
gained valuable combat and leadership experience fighting against the
Turks. German and Turkish rifles and other weapons left from World
War I were also available to many Syrian fighters. The Bedouin alone
had about 18,000 fighters armed with such weapons. Moreover, some
common purposes developed between different groups even while
serious military coordination remained elusive. These Syria fighters
never defeated the French, although Paris had considerable difficulty
re-establishing authority following World War II. After more than 400
people were killed in a 1945 French bombing of Damascus, the international and domestic outcry against these actions was so severe that
continuing French dominance over Syria became untenable. French
troops were replaced by British soldiers on the streets in Damascus as
a transitionary measure, and Syria became independent in August 1946.
Neep’s work is interesting and valuable, but some caution is also
appropriate. The work appears to draw heavily from his doctoral dissertation. As such, it is meticulously researched, but also makes extensive
use of the ponderous and tiresome jargon of historical sociology.
The work also mentions how French policies for Syria contributed to
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contemporary problems, although considering these links was not the
main focus of the book and were not fully developed. It is hardly the
author’s fault for choosing his own topic when the topic is an important
one, but many contemporary readers may at least be moderately concerned about current Syrian problems. Subsequently, for an especially
comprehensive understanding of the link between French mandate
policies and the contemporary Syrian civil war, Neep’s book can be
amiably supplemented with Nikolaos Van Dam’s often reprinted classic
The Struggle for Power in Syria.

Gulf Security and the US Military: Regime Survival and the
Politics of Basing
By Geoffrey F. Gresh
Reviewed by Russ Burgos, Associate Professor, Joint Special Operations Master
of Arts program, National Defense University, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

I

n Gulf Security and the US Military, Geoffrey F. Gresh makes an important contribution to studies of American overseas military basing policy
and US security assistance; he also adds to an increasingly rich literature
on the strategic significance of the Persian Gulf to America’s global security. Based on extensive archival research and an excellent command of
the secondary literature, Gresh argues, convincingly, that when analyzing
American basing policy in the Gulf region, one must bear in mind basing
decisions are bilateral – host nations’ decisions to extend or withdraw
basing rights are largely a function of politics, domestic and foreign. It
is not the case (as one so often hears in popular discourses and mass
media) that the USA simply “puts” its military bases here and there,
as if host nations were blank canvasses against which American strategists fling olive drab paint. Just as importantly, Gresh does not overstate
the importance of oil in US strategic calculations; inasmuch as all great
powers have had an interest in secure (or deniable) sources of Mideast
oil, oil is a constant, rather than a variable, and therefore does little to
explain how the United States and its partners reach basing decisions.
This book calls our attention to the strategic interaction inherent
in all overseas military basing decisions and shows how the internal
politics of Gulf states – which, as rentier states, often confront quite
delicate tradeoffs in their dealings with civil society – play vital roles in
determining the circumstances under which American military forces
will be hosted. The book starts by situating the question of overseas
basing policy within the framework of power politics, pointing out
“military presence has been essential for…power projection,” especially
given changes in military technology. (5)
Using case-study methods pioneered by the late scholar Alexander
L. George, Gresh analyzes the history of US basing policy in three Gulf
nations – Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia – and concludes with a
re-assessment of US-Saudi basing politics post-1991. Of the three, the
Saudi case study is the best developed, no doubt because the US-Saudi
relationship historically has been of greater significance to American
strategic calculations than those with Bahrain and Oman. Because each
of the three partner nations is a rentier state, the decision over hosting
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American military forces is both political (i.e., domestic politics) and
strategic, where ruling elites are confronted with often orthogonal
political needs: to maintain the legitimacy of their rule and satisfy key
domestic constituencies on the one hand and to balance external threats
to their nation-states (in the case of the three case study partners, most
often Iran and Iraq) on the other. Further complicating the task of sustaining internal regime legitimacy and balancing external regime threats
is the unpredictable impact of local and regional reactions to US policy
initiatives elsewhere. An American military installation can both ensure
and jeopardize the survival of a regime.
Gresh concludes with a valuable “lessons-learned” overview,
emphasizing a very important point that should animate future US
basing decisions – the growing threat of basing “blowback.” As delicate
as partner-nation politics can be, they are increasingly problematic for
US national security policy. The presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia,
he reminds us, was directly implicated in Osama bin Laden’s decision
to issue fatwas declaring global jihad against the United States and was,
therefore, a proximate cause of the 9/11 terror attacks and, consequently,
of the now many years of warfare that have followed. Where once a
coaling station or airbase was the solution to some strategic problem,
the politics of overseas basing are creating their own set of strategic
challenges. Geoffrey Gresh’s fine book is an excellent start to what is
certain to be an important and long-running national security debate.

Peacekeeping in South Sudan: One Year of Lessons from
Under the Blue Beret
By Robert B. Munson
Reviewed by Dr. Kersti Larsdotter, Assistant Professor at the Swedish Defence
University

T
New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015
188 pages
$90.00

he UN has been deployed since 2005 in what today is South Sudan.
After a six-year peace process, South Sudan became independent
in July 2011, and the previous UN mission was converted into the UN
Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS. The author, Robert B. Munson, was
deployed as the Chief of Planning (J5) to the mission for one year in
2011 and 2012. He also has a solid academic background.
Peacekeeping in South Sudan is, however, not primarily about the UN
mission in South Sudan. Instead, it provides a personal account of daily
life as an American military staff officer on a UN mission. Particularly,
it sheds light on two different, but interlinked, issues. First, it contributes
to our understanding of how differences in culture, language and identity influence work in a multinational and multidimensional mission.
This issue has been extensively dealt with elsewhere, and the book offers
few new insights. It does, however, provide a personal, well written,
and entertaining account of it. Second, and more novel, the book sheds
much needed light on how previous experiences and academic education
influence an individual’s understanding of the task at hand, and what
impact it has on the effectiveness of one’s work.
After introducing the reader to the American understanding of UN
peacekeeping missions and giving a short background of the conflict
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and the UN presence in Sudan and South Sudan, the book primarily
focuses on how the different cultures, identities and languages of the
UNMISS staff play out in day-to-day life. Among other things, Munson
gives several examples of how maddening by slow the bureaucracy of a
UN mission is, and offers the diverse background of the staff and the
complexity of the organization as an explanation.
In a nuanced and reflective way, Munson describes how, among
other things, the culture of officers occupying key positions influence
the general working environment, how language barriers impede a
common understanding, and how it all contributes to the lack of long
term planning, a common understanding of the mission – in this case
the protection of civilians, and even difficulties in solving day-to-day
problems. He also delicately addresses the question of how different
motives of the individual to join the mission as well as the inherent double
loyalties of working for UN – partly to the aim of the UN mission, partly
to the home country – contribute to incompatible mind sets and ambitions. He concludes that patience is of utmost importance, that different
backgrounds and cultures also contributes to a more nuanced way of
understanding the task at hand, and that many and long meetings should
actually not be discarded since it contributes to a common understanding between people.
In addition, Munson provides the reader with an amusing narrative
of what it is like to live on a camp, in very close quarters, together with
people from highly different cultures and with different habits, and how
it is to be a UN officer on the streets of Juba, the city in South Sudan
in which the camp is located. Here, the style is less analytical but more
entertaining. Before the conclusions, Munson offers a detailed and personal account of how his own religious background helps him to relate
to the religious life of the South Sudanese people.
The book leaves the reader with surprisingly little knowledge about
the UN mission in South Sudan, and only a few insights in the particularities of the mission. Instead, it offers an intriguing and well written
account of Munson’s personal experiences of working in a multinational
operation, as well as an unique and reflective account of how experiences, education and identities plays out in this context. He conclude
that his previous education, for example, his knowledge about Africa,
acquired during fieldwork in Tanzania during his PhD education, has
contributed to a better understanding of current events in South Sudan,
that his knowledge about “tribes” have helped him to navigate among
the different “tribes” of UNMISS, and that his language skills have
facilitated communication between colleagues from different countries.
He also emphasises how his “academic exposure to differing ideas,
opinions, and ways of working,” in a more general way helped him to
be “intellectually flexible and better tackle the tasks and take advantage
of the opportunities,” thereby making him more effective at work. (142)
Munson’s ability of critical thinking is clearly shown in his skillfully
balanced narrative of his time in UNMISS. The only thing missing is
a more explicit analysis throughout the book of how this ability of his
played out during his time in the mission.
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Military-Historical Studies
America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and
Vietnam
By Christopher A. Lawrence
Reviewed by David Fitzgerald, School of History, University College Cork,
Ireland
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2015
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$32.95

A

merica’s counterinsurgency wars have attracted no little scholarly
attention in recent years. In America’s Modern Wars: Understanding
Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, Christopher A. Lawrence of the Dupuy
Institute aims to provide some insight into the nature of these conflicts
by putting them in the context of eighty other post-World War II insurgencies. Using a database of 83 such insurgencies (including a number
of peacekeeping operations), Lawrence uses a quantitative approach to
search for answers to some of the major questions and assumptions
given rise to by the literature on counterinsurgency.
The book’s title is thus something of a misnomer – the work is
much more focused on providing some general insights on insurgencies
broadly defined, and offers specific analyses of America’s wars in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Vietnam only in three brief chapters towards the end
– but it does offer some thought-provoking lessons for those interested
in studying the phenomenon of insurgency.
The book’s origin as a series of reports commissioned by various US
government agencies (primarily, it seems, the US Army Center for Army
Analysis) is clear, as the chapters are often quite brief and limited in their
analytical depth. Lawrence’s quantitative approach may not appeal to all
readers but his findings do reward close attention. In 25 short chapters,
he offers a number of sometimes counterintuitive conclusions about the
importance of force ratios, rules of engagement, insurgent sanctuaries
and host of other factors. Rather than providing an overarching narrative, or a general theory of insurgency, the book instead provides a
wealth of specific insights. If we adopt Isaiah Berlin’s taxonomy of ideas,
this book is a fox that knows many things rather than a hedgehog that
knows one important thing.
Lawrence has two major findings: (1) force ratios – the ratio between
counterinsurgent and insurgent forces rather than counterinsurgent to
population – and (2) insurgent causes matter quite a bit in terms of
predicting the outcome of the conflict. The higher the counterinsurgent
to insurgent ratio, the more likely the counterinsurgency campaign is to
succeed. The other crucially important factor in this analysis is insurgent
motivation. Insurgencies based on broadly appealing rationales, such as
nationalism, tend to succeed, whereas those based on more limited, factional interests do not. According to Lawrence, other factors, such as the
presence of sanctuaries, third party support and the ratio of insurgents
to the general population do not matter nearly as much.
These findings are interesting, but should be considered as a starting point for further research rather than conclusions in their own right.
Lawrence’s approach is sometimes haphazard, perhaps an artifact of the
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book’s origin as a series of reports for government agencies. In a host of
chapters, he offers a very brief analysis based on his database, and then
some conclusions without ever really unpacking his assumptions in any
great depth, or working through the inevitable problems of correlation
and causation.
For instance, Lawrence’s finding that insurgent motivation is substantially important in determining the outcome of a conflict is worthy
of further study. But the author never provides an explanation for his
choice of three political concepts to categorize insurgencies (limited
[regional or factional], central idea [like nationalism] or overarching
idea [like communism]) or indeed his method for grouping conflicts
into the various categories. The French War in Indochina is classed
as a nationalist war whereas the Vietnam War (itself broken into two
phases – 1961-64 and 1965-73) is described as an insurgency defined
by communism. Given the continuities between the Viet Minh and the
National Liberation Front and the strong undercurrent of nationalism
present in both conflicts, such a choice is confusing and surely worthy
of further comment.
Similarly, the author’s inclusion of a variety of peacekeeping missions
in the database (although certainly not all post-1945 UN peacekeeping
operations) muddies the waters quite a bit as classifying the results of
such operations as an “insurgent” or “counterinsurgent” win is surely
oversimplifying things, especially when these conflicts often involve
more than two parties.
Lastly, it would have been useful to see the author update his literature review on insurgency and counterinsurgency. Lawrence provides us
with an overview of some of the classical scholarship on insurgencies,
but there is little to be seen of the vast post-2004 outpouring of work
on these conflicts. David Kilcullen is mentioned only in passing, and we
hear nothing of John Mackinlay, Stathis Kalyvas, Paul Staniland and all
the other scholars who have done much to advance our understanding
of the nature of insurgency in recent years.
The most problematic omission is the lack of any deep engagement with some of the more interesting quantitative work that has been
carried out on insurgencies in recent years. For instance, there is some
brief commentary on the Iraq troop surge, but there is no reference to or
engagement with the work of Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro, who used
quantitative approaches to test the reasons for the decline in violence.
Nor does the book address Berman, Shapiro and Felter’s work on the
economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. While these studies operate
at a less general level than Lawrence, they still could have enriched his
model. Similarly, Lyall and Wilson’s work on explaining counterinsurgency wars, which relies on a large database of 286 insurgencies would
have been worth engaging, as it offers some conclusions at odds with
this book.
Even so, America’s Modern Wars will still be of interest to those who
wish to understand more about what governs success in insurgency
and counterinsurgency. Lawrence has posed a number of interesting
questions for scholars of counterinsurgency and engagement with his
conclusions could provide valuable new insights for the field.
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Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era
to the Twenty-First Century
By Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich
Reviewed by Jill Sargent Russell, Teaching Fellow, Joint Services Command and
Staff College, Shrivenham, UK
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B

illed as a comprehensive survey of American military history for
undergraduates, this work achieves much. Matthew Muehlbauer
and David Ulbrich do the heavy lifting to produce a text which, given
the breadth of the subject, is both comprehensive and compelling.
Furthermore, against the standard of a university textbook, it is readable,
quick-paced, and offers just enough thought-provoking commentary to
encourage young scholars further in military history. I have no qualms
recommending this book for its intended function, it being entirely fit
for purpose as an introductory text. Notwithstanding this broad success,
the comparatively insignificant place accorded to the naval component in American military history is an important flaw which must be
acknowledged.
Given its length, it is impossible to spend this review considering
details and what was done well. However, a few points should be made.
Turning first to what this book is and is not, we must be clear that it is
a text for beginner use. Although certain generalizations and omissions
in the narrative must be accepted, this survey still succeeds in taking
good account of the strengths and trends in recent scholarship. There is
as well a clear desire to address peripheral issues often left out by similar
texts, such as logistics or social themes. These are interesting and useful,
although at times it feels they are mentioned without sufficient further
consideration. Taking logistics, the chapter on the Interwar period
covers aircraft and vehicles, but the narrative limits itself to their application and development as weapons of war. And yet, mighty though
tanks, bombers, and fighters were, it was the truck and the promise of air
mobility which transformed American warfare. For the consideration
of Parameters readers the work would serve well the needs of an ROTC
course.
What is troubling is the relative absence of the navy and the maritime component of history. Although a significant shortcoming in the
coverage of this book, it is a larger problem reflecting much about the
field of military history generally. Bluntly put, the field does not always
deal well with the naval component: nor give due credit to what constitutes seapower in peacetime. Too often constrained by Mahanian
expectations, the tough sinews of transportation and seamanship are
given short shrift. But it is upon these factors that wartime success often
depends. For instance, the authors write that following the Revolution,
“Beyond fighting pirates, the US Navy saw little combat in the 20 years
after the Algerian War.” Granted, the title is “Ways of War,” but the
subtitle is more broadly conceived as American military history, and as
such it is rather meant to include more than merely the conflicts. The US
Navy in the early 19th century may not have been fighting many battles,
but it was upon the seas and growing as an institution. In Chapter 6 on
the Civil War, the military capabilities of the Union and Confederacy
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contemplates only those of the armies, even as the former’s dominance
of the seas would hamstring the Confederate cause as much as it had
the Patriot cause nearly a century before. This general preference for a
land-centric focus continues throughout the book.
If this book were about “ways of war” then it would seem to argue
that the United States has relied predominantly upon landpower. But
the strength and security of the nation, its military and strategic experience, has been of a maritime nature and has always depended as much
upon the navy as the army. Going forward, in contemplation of future
editions and revisions, it would be good to see the naval story more
developed and better incorporated into the larger narrative. Until then,
however, Muehlbauer and Ulbrich’s work more than suffices to welcome
new students to the subject.

Power, Law and the End of Privateering
By Jan Martin Lemnitzer
Reviewed by Martin Murphy, PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for
Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax and Visiting Fellow at the
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College, London.

J

an Martin Lemnitzer has written a book that is important, timely, and
astonishing.
It is important in several ways. First, because many of the norms,
notions of sovereignty and international legal constructs that shape our
world have arisen first in the maritime domain. Of these none is arguably
more important than the center-piece of this book, the Declaration of
Paris, signed in 1856. Secondly, because the purpose of the Declaration
was, by outlawing privateering, securing the rights of neutrals and
placing limits on blockade to make the seas safe for the transport of
goods in times of conflict, it is a reminder of the central importance of
the relationship between economics and naval power. This is something
that was downgraded – at least by the US Navy – for much of the Cold
War and in the years of strategic uncertainly that have followed. It is
timely because, as China grows in importance as an international trading
power, the US Navy may now need to pay as much attention to its own
economic role as it does to Beijing’s rising challenge to maritime order
in the East and South China Seas. It is astonishing because, as Lemnitzer
admits, his book explores the borderland between law and war, a region
many students of both subjects find “infuriatingly complex and mildly
dull.” (4) Nonetheless, Lemnitzer has produced a book that is at once an
eye-opener and (for the most part)a page-turner.
Prior to the congress in Paris that brought the Crimean War to a
close in 1856, a mechanism to enable agreement on international norms
was almost non-existent. Yes, the concept of state sovereignty and recognition of basic religious freedoms had been established at Westphalia
in 1648, and the international slave trade had been outlawed at Vienna
in 1815; but these amounted to almost isolated events.
For a similar period, British naval power had rested on its asserted
right to blockade enemy ports and search neutral shipping for contraband; that is to say for goods, as defined by Britain, of use to an enemy
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in wartime. It had backed its words by building a navy capable of carrying out these missions of search and blockade globally, including the
creation of a battle fleet large enough to resist any power attempting to
interfere.
Neutral states had opposed this bitterly and on two occasions in
the early years of the epic struggle with France between 1793 and 1815
had combined together in sufficient strength to cause Britain problems.
Nelson’s mission at Copenhagen in 1801 had been to smash one such
neutral alliance. However, in the early days and weeks of the Crimean
War, Britain—to cement its alliance with France and to prevent neutral
states from banding together and frustrating their joint war aims—
announced it would soften its traditional hardline position regarding
the transport of contraband by neutral shipping for the duration of
hostilities.
Not surprisingly, once the fighting ceased, France, which had
suffered the effects of Britain’s policy during the Napoleonic Wars particularly, was keen to see Britain’s softer position continue by enshrining
it in an international declaration. The surprise was that Britain accepted
without protest.
Lemnitzer’s purpose is to establish why it did so, and why—
even though Britain gained huge advantages from its restraint—the
Declaration came under sustained attack in Britain as much as it did
elsewhere prior to World War I, before disintegrating during the war
itself. He also asks why the terms of the Declaration, which laid the
foundation for what has been referred to subsequently as the world’s first
period of globalization, have never been revived.
Britain agreed because it was being squeezed from two directions.
First, its own trade had expanded exponentially since 1815; its import
dependency had become vulnerable to any state that sanctioned privateers: the states which presented the greatest threat were the United
States (which regarded privateering as its main strategic weapon against
Britain) and Russia (which more than once schemed to issue letters of
marque to willing US captains). Secondly, returning to the old right of
search would likely antagonize too many neutrals in a British-dominated
world of globalized trade. If Britain was forced to fight an alliance of
neutral states, or if the United States was joined by Russia or France in
a privateering war, either could impose an intolerable strain on even
Britain’s considerable naval resources.
Lemnitzer argues previous historians have paid too little attention
to this dilemma, assuming the Palmerston government in Britain signed
the Declaration either in a swoon of liberal ideology or in a typically
British act of calculated perfidiousness. His explanation is much simpler:
the threat of privateering was too great to allow it to continue and the
price of neutral support in its elimination too small not to pay it.
In effect Britain turned the naval order of the oceans on its head.
Neutral states, instead of combining to limit British naval power, a hugely
risky undertaking, now had Britain on their side. Any belligerent violating the rights of neutral shipping “could not avoid hurting the interests
of British merchants and ship-owners” triggered a reaction from the
British government and, ultimately, the Royal Navy. (179) The freedom of
neutrals to trade was elevated almost overnight from a desired objective
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to a norm that over the next twenty years spread around the globe. It
was, moreover, enforced by British sea power working in cooperation
with all commercial nations interested in the uninterrupted movement
of goods. “International law,” writes Lemnitzer, “was by far the most
effective means of securing this freedom everywhere on the high seas.”
But underlying this fact was the implied threat of overwhelming British
(and neutral) force “against anyone who tried to defy or subvert the
rules.” (179) To achieve this end Britain signed-up to a revolution in
international law making.
The detail with which Lemnitzer invests his account is essential
reading, even if it might slow the page-turning pace in the middle chapters. In these, he recounts the history of the significant and contentious
Marcy and Cass Amendments. Britain would have balked at the former,
but would have stood alone in doing so. It could thank Bismarck for
sparing it from diplomatic defeat. The great statesman misunderstood
the role of the Declaration in the increasingly interwoven late-nineteenth
century world; he rejected the treaty as unreliable, which set Germany on
a course that eventually led it to adopt unrestricted submarine warfare
with a clear conscience (and disastrous strategic results).
This attitudinal shift by a major power against the predominantly
liberal thrust of the Declaration did not sink the agreement immediately. It did, however, chime with the rise of Social Darwinism, a new
“spirit of the age” that encouraged an unrestrained pursuit of national
advantage which ran counter to the Declaration’s principals. At sea, this
spirit was channeled into the use of mines, the newly invented torpedo,
specialized motor torpedo boats, cruisers and naval concepts such the
French Jeune Ecole that aimed to attack British trade without regard for
the niceties of international law.
The 1909 Declaration of London which aimed to revive the
Declaration of Paris achieved some success but in the end defeated
itself. It complicated the Paris Declaration by adding new rules that
unintentionally allowed competing interpretations of what was meant
by blockade and contraband to emerge. Here Lemnitzer overlaps with
Nicholas Lambert who describes in Planning Armageddon (2012) how
the British Admiralty, by now thoroughly disillusioned at the direction
neutral rights were taking, planned, in the years prior to World War
I, to ignore them completely and bring Germany to its knees with a
lightning campaign of financial warfare that would be over before any
neutral power could respond. Why this failed is left best to Lambert, but
Lemnizter’s work adds additional legal and political context to Lambert’s
economic and political thesis.
Finally, and to reinforce the relevance of Lemnitzer’s work for
contemporary concerns, it is important to remember the Declaration
of Paris still remains in force. Its rules on neutral trade populate the
pages of naval commanders’ handbooks the world over; yet, the enforcement mechanism that for so long made it effective – that is say the de
facto alliance between the world’s greatest naval power and the world’s
maritime trading nations – has been, at best, downgraded. As Lemnitzer
writes, navies, “unlike in the 19th century…offer no guarantee or even
reassurance that belligerents will respect the rights of those not involved
in their conflict to use the oceans as they wish.” (190)
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With this in mind it is disappointing to observe the US Navy, which
in the original 2007 version of its current strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for
21st-Century Seapower, grasped the importance of economics and its role as
the naval guardian of the global maritime order, is now retreating from
this position in the 2015 revision, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready. This document reasserts the Navy’s
Mahanian-derived emphasis on “warfighting,” and power projection in
a new framework which it terms “all-domain access.” These are legitimate and necessary naval objectives. However, to re-emphasize them in
a world where China, America’s nearest peer competitor, is consciously
aiming to become a global maritime trading and naval power, and is
seeking to realize oceanic preeminence in ways that are at odds with
the global maritime order of the past two hundred years, appears to be
perverse unless they are anchored in an over arching economic mission.
China was one of the first signatories of United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the UN treaty which has been described as a
“constitution for the oceans.” Yet, like Bismark’s Germany, it is clearly
working to undermine provisions in the treaty that safeguard neutral
rights. It is doing so, moreover, as it builds a mass of air, naval, and
paramilitary power sufficient to take on the US Navy, the naval force
that neutrals look to for leadership and protection against any power
that seeks to defy or subvert the rules that permit free use of the sea.
Jan Lemnitzer has written an important and timely book; it is both
an erudite history and a work of contemporary relevance. It is also, most
astonishingly, a page-turner. It deserves the widest possible audience.
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hen I wrote my own book on 1914, I got into the habit of noticing
news items that a scholar a century from now might use to make
the argument that a war between China and the United States was inevitable. Indeed, such a case might not be too hard to make in retrospect.
One might point to the accidental American bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the EP3 plane incident in 2001, and SinoAmerican tension over the dispute about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as
steps along the way to war. Or, one could take the structural approach
and look at the rapid rise of Chinese power to argue that war resulted
from a tectonic shift in the global order. My point in this small exercise
was less to argue that war between the United States and China is or is
not inevitable than to show how much easier large processes in history
look in retrospect than they do to contemporaries.
Still, the China analogy will not go away. Those who use it argue that
our world looks increasingly like the world of 1914, with a rising China
taking the place of a rising Germany and the United States playing the
role of Great Britain, the established global power that is struggling to
maintain its place in the face of a new challenger. As with most historical
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analogies, this one can often obfuscate as much as it clarifies, but it
remains in the public and scholarly discourse.
The Next Great War? provides the fullest exploration of the analogy
yet. The authors are a veritable all-star cast of political scientists supplemented by a few historians and the former Australian prime Minister
Kevin Rudd. As might be expected, the authors do not agree on all
points and the quality of the essays is inconsistent, especially in their use
of the latest historical scholarship. Still, the book is thought-provoking
and insightful, especially when the subject is in the hands of thinkers like
Graham Allison and Joseph Nye.
The authors do tend to agree on a few salient points. They see
much value in the analogy of World War I to the current situation in
the western Pacific, but they appropriately acknowledge that similarity does not imply inevitability. Any decisions for war will be made by
real people, responding to real events rather than sterile actors trapped
in geopolitical structures predetermined by a century-old conflict. The
value of studying the analogy, then, is not in seeking formulaic answers
(other than the obvious one of avoiding the 1914 nightmare at all costs
short of national survival) than in what it might help us think through
as the two superpowers negotiate their shared future.
They also agree that three factors in our world that were absent in
1914 are likely to help limit the chances of a war. First, because each side
has nuclear weapons, the cost of going to war may become prohibitive,
forcing the two sides to come to diplomatic agreement instead. Second,
because they share (and dominate) an interconnected global economy,
war is likely to cost far more than it could possibly achieve. Third,
international institutions are far stronger than they were in 1914, thus
providing more opportunities for resolution of conflict short of war.
The book also has a number of essays that refer to the so-called
Thucydides trap. The phrase normally refers to the way the perception of
growth of one state’s power (Athens or China) can stoke fear in another
(Sparta or the United States), making the latter more likely to go to war.
Thus, to return to 1914, a power on the decline like Austria-Hungary can
be more destabilizing to the international order than a rising one. The
Thucydides trap can also refer to the ways great powers can get drawn
into wars on behalf of an ally like Corcyra, Corinth, North Korea, or
Japan. This latter problem seems most likely to create trouble, especially
given America’s many bilateral treaty obligations.
The strength of the book comes in the variety of approaches and
methods the authors use. Its greatest weakness is the tendency of some
authors to lean on the most popular historians rather than the bestrespected. As a result, a few old saws appear here, like the myth of
enthusiasm for war in 1914 and the dominance of military planners in
the decisions for war. Still, the book gives us much to contemplate and
is well worth the time spent wrestling with its core ideas.

